"Hopes and Challenges: How do People Cope with Social Change? PAPER ABSTRACTS

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Emily Fa	alk							

Communication Neuroscience: using neuroimaging to predict real world outcomes

Can looking to the brain help us predict how individuals or even whole populations will respond to social influence? In this talk, Falk will discuss a 'brain-as-predictor' approach to linking neuroscience data and real-world outcomes. As examples of the brain-as-predictor approach, Falk will describe her current work using neural responses to basic tasks as predictors of real-world outcomes outside of the scanner. In addition to presenting new data, this talk highlights methods for connecting neural responses collected in the laboratory with ecologically valid processes and outcomes across domains

Renata Siemieńska

Women and Men - Actors of Fluid Modernity. Inconsistency of Values, Behaviors and Positions.

The conception of fluid modernity (e.g. Bauman, Giddens, Beck) is used to address gender related problems of societies representing certain level of economic, political, social and cultural development. The direction and speed of changes of values and behaviors in some cases are different in female and male subpopulations. Moreover, increasing level of education of societies, especially of women shows that the level of education (not gender) is often the most important factor differentiating values. While, behaviors and positions of men and women used to be shaped by factors of different nature which are also changing as longitudinal studies demonstrate

Endogenous social change as a chance for sustainable development

There are various kinds of social change. Usually we think that big changes have to be initiated by big external investments. The prevailing view is that a stagnant community can be enlivened only by an external force. There are however opposite situations, where the change-process is generated by the society. In the worst slums there may appear an initiative which, due to its success, creates an enabling environment for other initiatives to germinate. These micro-changes, in an auto-catalytic way, generate further enterprising up to the breakthrough point of an emergent change in macro-scale, when the whole society changes: there appears trust, empowerment and propensity for cooperation; and as a consequence – structural changes of institutions, procedures and

norms. These two ways of development represent one of the key questions of the contemporary sociology: is social change exogenous or endogenous? The exogenous change, for example new investments from outside, may have negative impact: the society becomes dependent on the external resources and doesn't generate own initiatives; also is vulnerable to economic perturbations (e.g. if the investments goes to bankruptcy). The endogenous development is embedded in internal potential of people, groups and societies and leads to the emergence of civic social capital which may generate economic capital, though based on own experience. Behind the latter kind of change there usually stand innovators (social entrepreneurs) who have an empathetic understanding of the specific region and its latent potentials. Related case studies will be presented.

Consequences of post-enlargement migration. Perspective of a donor country.

Abstract: The post - enlargement migration due to its scale and dynamics surprised societies and politicians in both sending and receiving countries of the EU. The outflow from Poland has been described as one of the biggest migration in the post war history of this country. This paper analyses social, economic and demographic consequences of post-enlargement migration from the perspective of a sending coutry. The official statistical data and research findings are analysed here along with the phenomenon of return migration.

Constructing new identities for Eastern Poland

The fall of communism has reinforced the old Orientalist model of perception of the European space as consisting of the superior Western Europe and inferior Eastern Europe. This has produced a challenge for eastern European countries and regions. While reinventing their identities they have been forced not only to adapt to the values of democracy, capitalism and globalization but also to redefine their relation to the notions of "east" and "west". The proposed paper will analyze this process on the example of the case study of the Eastern Poland. It will show how the region has been dealing with its "eastern identity" in past two decades. The paper will present in particular analysis of symbolic strategies of elites of Eastern Poland and their implications. As it will be suggested, they included rejection, redefinition and avoidance. Attempts at removing the oriental stigma and uses of Western European discourses in dealing with Poland's own "easterness" will be presented. The paper will also discuss new identities of eastern regions and ideologies of new regionalism and their relations to identity debates in Poland.

Young Voters and Political Repositioning in Poland

The spectacular electoral success of Janusz Palikot among young voters, high school and university students, and among those who radically distance themselves from the church may suggest that a sort of age-centered cultural repositioning has begun on the Polish political scene. Apart from the usual socio-economic and political factors any possible future changes on this scene will be accompanied by demographic replacements within electorates, which may weaken the role of the communist (and even early post-communist) past in shaping attitudes and voting patterns. These changes will also be influenced by institutional developments within the EU and the Eurozone, which may lead to EU questions and attitudes gaining new social and electoral salience. Our aim in this paper is (1) to look back in time to check for attitudinal and vote differences between young cohorts in the year 2011 and young cohorts of the past decade, and (2) to project these differences into the future by counterfactuals and extrapolations. To this aim we will use 2011, 2007, and 2005 editions of the Polish General Election Survey (PGSW) and data from Polish Panel on Social Structure and Mobility (POLPAN).

Differential psychological reactions to observing violence and attitudes about violence in the USA and Poland from 1980 to 2010

Between the late 1970s and the end of the first decade of the 21st century substantial social changes occurred in the USA and Poland. In this chapter we compare data collected in the two countries on some social cognitions and emotional reactions relating to violence at five different time points between 1980 and 2010. We begin by comparing children's rehearsal of aggressive scripts, perceptions of observed violence, and identification with violent people in 1980 as Poland was beginning its transformation. Then we compare college students' normative beliefs about aggression right after the fall of communism in 1991. Next we compare the children's samples from 1980 when they had become young adults in 1995 and examine how they differed at that time on the same social cognitions measured when they were children as well as their normative beliefs about aggression. Moving on the to 21st century, we then examine in 2000 and again in 2008-2010 how college students in the two countries differ in their emotional reactions to observing violence as well as on their normative beliefs. We examine how youth in the two countries differ on these social cognitions and emotional reactions in all these periods and how the differences (and changes in the differences between periods) relate to their exposure to violence and to their aggressive behavior.

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Dynamic of Juvenile Aggressive Offences in Times of Transformation in Poland (data from 1991 until 2006)

Recently, in majority of European countries one can observe a substantial increase in crime committed by juvenile perpetrators. The aim of the presentation was to analyze dynamics of this phenomenon in Poland during socio-political transformation (mainly in the period between 1991 and 2006). In the analysis we used available statistic of valid courts sentences (for adult sample) and judicial decisions (juveniles sample) from the archives of Ministry of Justice. We were especially interested in the dynamics of aggressive offences" including homicide, serious and other bodily injury, assault and battery, use of dangerous tools, punis-hable threat, compelling by force, rape, theft violence, and robbery. Justice convictions were compared between adult males and juvenile males (up to 17 years old) and between adult females and juvenile females (up to 17 years old). Major findings: the total number of convictions showed much higher increase among juvenile males than adults (the difference especially pronounced when aggressive offences were considered). The same pattern was identified when juvenile females were compared with adult females. Of particular interest, we found that the most rapid increase in aggressive crimes in this period was noted among juvenile females. Probably, juvenile females' sub-population experienced the most negative psychosocial consequences of the socio-cultural changes accompanying the sociopolitical transformation in Poland.

Movie messages: Effects of tobacco and alcohol imagery in movies on viewers' substance use.

The media are a well documented source of social influence. A growing body of research from the United States reveals effects of exposure to smoking and drinking depictions in Hollywood movies on the substance use behaviors of American viewers. We know that these movies are distributed and viewed globally, but little is known about their effects on viewers in markets outside the United States. Are Hollywood movies as influential outside the US as they seem to be within it? Using theory and research which position movies as a social influence, I discuss the evidence for effects of exposure to movie smoking and drinking on youth in the US and I describe new research on exposure to movie substance use in Europe. I also identify an American case where the relation between movie exposures and behavior is attenuated—or so it seems. Integrating these three areas of inquiry, I argue for the importance of considering movies, and entertainment media more generally, as important forces in social change.

Social Change and Individual Uncertainty

Any systemic social change results in a sudden increase of uncertainty with respect to how to find ourselves in a new social space, how to build life better than before in the new space. In time of transition, the old social structure falls down, old social rules stop working. The new rules are, to a large extent, not known or even not existing yet. Moreover, the new is unstable, directions in which the new changes are often not easy to predict and are difficult to adapt to them. The uncertainty is likely to be a source of social frustration, tendency to simplify subjective view of social world (stereotyping), preference to make the rules of social life safe simple and protecting from overuse by others (like an equality rule)... The uncertainty feeds blaming others for negative effects of of the change. This line of reasoning is higly speculative. The presentation will, however, show some empirical data (taken from here and there, mainly from from surveys) suporting the "uncertainty hypothesis".

Conspiracy theory of Jews in the times of democratic transformation

Conspiracy theories construct groups of people as intentionally engaged in secret, hidden activities aimed at some extremely negative end (e.g., planecrash, economic disaster). Such theories may vary from explanations of single events to highly stable conspiracy views of nations, states, world financial organizations etc. In the latter case, hidden strive for (absolute) power – over the world, over "us" – forms a central content of conspirational cognitions. In our studies, conducted during the last 20 years, we focused on understanding the naïve theory of Jewish conspiracy, its psychological determinants and functional meaning. Our major conclusions might be summarized as follows:

- There exists conspiracy mentality (conspiracy theories tend to substantially covary);
- High perceived entitativity and essentialism of the target groups is associated with their conspiracy construing;
- Conspiracy theories have a high regulatory potential (are reliable predictors of a variety of negative behavioral intentions toward the target);
- Jews are seen as a prototypical example of a conspiring group;
- Nowadays, a theory of Jewish conspiracy forms a central component of anti-Semitism in Poland;
- Economic deprivation following systemic transition fueled conspiracy theories of Jews, as a lay explanation of people's misfortunes;
- Whereas overt components of anti-Jewish attitudes (e.g., as expressed in the temperature of feelings, social distance, or discrimination approval) tended to decrease over the last two decades, conspiracy theory of Jews appears to be a very stable phenomenon.

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Piotr Radkiewicz			

How many similarities and how many differences? The nature of national identity in a united Europe

At the beginning of XXI century Europe is subject to the internal integration on a scale having no historical precedent. In the widespread opinion the very important factors facilitating the process of integration should be sought in a historical-cultural reality of a kind of common European identity as well as in a redefinition of the concept of national interest. Therefore, several interesting question may get our attention: To what extent the countries forming the European community differ, and to what extent are similar in so called national attitudes? What is the nature of European patriotism and a sense of national identity? Are there any divisions here? If so, what is their nature? The author tries to answer these questions by analyzing data from two studies on "National Identity" (1995 and 2003) conducted within the International Social Survey Programme. Description and classification of the European countries on different dimensions of national attitudes leads to the conclusion that Europe is divided into two fundamentally different national-cultural clusters. Their origin results from a huge disparity in the level of collective self-esteem, which is an expression of civic pride in a quality of liberaldemocratic state in various aspects of its functioning. It also turns out that the basic division corresponds almost perfectly to the "cultural shift" on a dimension defined by R. Inglehart as survival vs. self-expression culture. What is important and not so obvious, the other central dimension of cultural values, defined as tradition vs. secularizationrationalism, in no way contributes to explanation of the nature of two basic nationalcultural European clusters.

The Polish people's regret for the Polish People's Republic. Structure and functions of nostalgia as manifested in popular attitudes to the recent past in Poland.

Nostalgia often functions as a remedy for a discontinuity in people's lives. Is Polish "nostalgia for communism" a cure for the difficulties caused by the dramatic changes in Polish life after 1989? Twenty three years after the end of the Polish People's Republic, strong regret and nostalgia for the society that existed before is observed in daily Polish life. A special representative survey (N = 614), conducted by the author, found 64% to 88% of Poles over 39 judging their life to have been better before 1989 than in 2010 in various respects (general assessment, work, family life, health, finances, friendships, general well-being, leisure, future prospects, sense of security, hobbies). While evidence exists attributing this nostalgia to social, demographic, and economic factors, the present regret may seem remarkable in view of the fact that the fall of communism was greeted with wide approval among Poles. Data analysis indicates that longing for the "good old days" could also be related to psychological issues. This presentation reexamines the common view of nostalgia as a relatively simple reaction to dissatisfaction with current life. A more nuanced model is proposed. Nostalgia is

revealed to have a heterogeneous structure: different types of nostalgia relate in different ways with functions such as increase of collective continuity or reinforcement of national identification. The work is a part of a larger study examining the role of nostalgia as an emotion and the role of collective memory in the positive assessment of the Polish communist past.

Household Saving Profiles in Poland during 1990 - 2010

The aim of this paper is to show the saving profiles of Polish households during the first decade after a change of economic system in Poland in 1990 and during the second decade influenced by Poland's joining the European Union in 2004 and by the global financial crisis that started in 2008. The analysis will be based on both macro and micro data on household savings from household disposable income. The macro data on savings reflects the effects of main economic determinants of household saving (economic growth, income inequality, social security system) and temporary factors, like financial crisis or European funding. The micro perspective of household savings shows the rising trend of household saving rates during two decades with moderate ups and downs around the trend. The main reason for household saving was income uncertainty. Two decades of the market economy system in Poland are characterized by growing income inequality measured by Gini coefficient. The paper will show that the saving profiles of households during the first decade reflect the process of building up of household wealth by all socio-economic groups of households (ordered by income level, education, age etc.) with an influence of those who accumulated for their own businesses. The second decade is marked by further growing income inequalities and greater concentration of household savings in higher income decile groups of households. The household saving process seems less democratized in the second decade but is still a most common way of protecting against income uncertainty.

Economic and social inequality and justice sentiments in Poland during transformation 1992-2010. Based on the *Polish General Social Surveys* 1992-2010

The thesis that the economic transformation process in Poland after 1989 resulted in huge changes in the occupational and economic conditions of different social groups and strata as well as in the structure of individual and group attitudes and values, has already been incorporated into the structure of everyday knowledge. There are also no doubts about the theses that the most important mechanisms of the way in which economic changes affect the social structure are connected with the development of the private sector, market employment mechanisms and unemployment and also the change of the way in which professional qualifications are rewarded. The conviction that the systemic changes caused a radical change in the patterns and size of wage and income inequalities also became one of the canons of sociological and economic knowledge. The

scale of these changes is particularly visible if we compare economic differentiations in Poland prior to and following the systemic transformation. Translating the above postulate into an empirical analysis plan, we shall refer to data from comparative survey studies conducted in Poland in the years 1992-2010 within the framework of *Polish General Social Surveys* 1992-2010 project (conducted in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999. 2002, 2005, 2008, 2010). One should add that each edition of the PGSS use comparable standards of the adult population nationwide representative sample selection, identical economic and social differentiation indicators and identical distribution justice perception indicators.

Decreasing Perception of the Opportunities for Social Advancement Reflects Lowering Income Mobility

The goal of the paper is to show increasing salaries and income inequality in Poland comparing to neighbouring transition countries - Czech Republic and Hungary. According to frequently quoted research (Wilamson 1985, Galdor, Thisddon 1996), the difference between income of highly qualified specialist and other workers diminishes with economic development. This stage is not attained in Poland. Income mobility was particularly intensive in the first years of transition and gradually diminished. The policy of minimizing the role of the state and the drive to comply as quickly as possible with the requirements of the economic efficiency resulted in less solidarity and social protection than in the old market economies of Western Europe. As public institutions perform less efficiently as a result of limited funds, the development of human capital depends more and more on the effort of the family and its accumulated wealth. The results of research on savings motives show it clearly. Subjective feelings reflect the reality. In the group of low income mobility Gini coefficient proved to be significant factor affecting satisfaction with income. The perception of the opportunities for social advancement has decreased with time and depends more and more on level of education attained. In the same time the feeling of inequality in access to education has increased. The research is made on the basis of data from Polish Household Budget Surveys for the years 1996-2009 and the data from Consortium of Household Panels for European Socio-Economic Research (CHER). The data from Polish General Social Survey and International Social Survey Program, Social Inequality for the years 1992 and 1999 and 2010 are also used. The paper concerns mostly Poland but some comparisons with Hungary – member of CHER and ISSP consortia as well as Czech Republic – are discussed.

Perceived and real role of PhD as seen by doctoral students and PhD graduates

During last decade we observed a dramatic increase of PhD programs and students in Poland. As a result PhD degree is changing its position from elitist advanced degree to

the one obtained by ever growing fraction of the population. The increase in the number of these students may be explained by several factors. First, it is a response of both public and private universities, to the increased demand for doctoral studies, due to perceived, devaluation of MA degree on the labor market. Secondly, due to new high education financing rules it's relatively easy to obtaining additional resources for creating doctoral programs. Also, the number of private universities, which are able to grant PhD degrees is growing in recent years. Our study was aimed at elucidating the reason why students enroll into PhD programs in Poland. We conducted 123 in-depth interviews with doctoral students and PhD graduates in five academic centers (Warsaw, Lodz, Torun, Rzeszow and Wrocław). Our results indicate that the respondents decided to continue their studies and obtain PhD primarily to delay entering the job market (due to weak job market and/or no clear idea what type of career to pursue) and increase their chances for a fulfilling job. They also mentioned the role of mentor in convincing them to continue their education, as well as willingness to continue their work initiated during their earlier studies. Contrary to this perception, our results indicate that the degree relatively rarely helped PhD graduates in finding better job in private sector. Some of the respondents found that they were perceived as overgualified by prospective employers, which decreased their chances of getting the job. From the perspective of employers, this is primarily due to the increased costs of hiring a better qualified applicant, but also the perceptions that PhD holders are not prepared to work in private sector. At the same time respondents mentioned other, less obvious aspects of pursuing the PhD, such as higher mobility, self-fulfillment, ability to travel and expanding intellectual horizons. In all, our results paint a relatively complex picture of the reasons why students enter the PhD programs, which are only partially confirmed by real life experiences.

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++++++++++++++ Fomasz Jerzyński	+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++	++
Marcin Žieliński		

20 years of International Social Survey Programme in Poland. "Religion" 1991 - 2011.

In 1992 Poland joined ISSP Programme by conducting a study about Religion. In 1999 and 2011 this study was repeated - most of the questions were asked in the same way. This allows to make comparative analysis of changes in attitudes toward religion over time. Some of changes in answers distributions concerning religious attitudes in Poland will be presented on pictures and simple graphs.

Psychological and psychosocial determinants of perception and acceptance of the euro in Poland

The prospective introduction of a common currency is the object of heated debate among economists. Meanwhile, the social and psychological aspects of this change are seldom discussed despite the fact that the experiences of countries which already have a common currency suggest that citizens have serious doubts as to such issues as future inflation and that nationalistic stereotypes are reviving. Existing research has demonstrated that attitudes toward currency change depend on such psychological factors as consumer optimism, sense of social identity, sense of national identity, emotional attachment, or susceptibility to various cognitive heuristics (Van Everdingen & Van Raaij, 1998; Luna-Arocas et al., 2001; Meier-Pesti & Kirchler, 2003a, 2003b; Routh & Burgoyne, 1998; Gereitemeyer et al., 2005; Jonas et al., 2005). The poster presents the results of research analyzing the effects of selected psychological and sociodemographic variables on Poles' attitudes toward the common European currency.

Cultural and social capitals of women getting to power positions in rural communities in Poland. The case of village representatives.

Historically speaking, the institution of village representative (soltys) has a long and well established tradition in Poland. Its roots can be traced back to the processes of rural settlement under German and Dutch law, which occurred in the Medieval Age. Nowadays, elected village representatives can be shortly described as liaisons between the residents of rural communities and local authorities at the level of communes. In year 2010 the overall number of village representatives in Poland was 40 268. According to the traditional concept of gender roles, rural women and men were expected to engage in different types or organizational structures and collective initiatives. The former used to take part in actions related to the development of local culture, children upbringing and household conditions, while the latter were more involved in organizations linked to agriculture and rural self-government. However, the percentage of women among village representatives has increased significantly in last decades. In year 1967 the share of female village representatives was only 2,8%, while in 2010 women constituted 30,7% of all village representatives in Poland. Does this trend mean that women come to power in rural communities? In relation to this question, the aim of the presentation is to explore the determinants, which may facilitate the women's candidacy and their election as village representatives. In the light of conducted research, the increasing number of women in rural self-government has much to do with its lack of political influence and benefits combined with hard work and growing expectations of both local authorities and village residents, who see village representatives as potential civic society leaders. The second goal is to look at the characteristics of social resources used by women village representatives in comparison with men. The research shows that the sources of their cultural and social capital differ according to gender. In addition, men often participate in more varied networks of local

cooperation and strengthen their social capital more effectively. Surprisingly, in these circumstances, both women and men village representatives are capable to perform successfully similar kinds of local initiatives.

Model example of collective action? Protests against ACTA!

Signing by Poland the international copyright treaty known ACTA caused the nationwide wave of protests. The data from 130 Internet users were collected during the events. In accordance with the model elaborated by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) attitude toward collective action was predicted positively by identification with demonstrators, perceived illegitimacy of signing the treaty and assumed demonstrators' efficacy. Intention to engage in normative collective action, such as signing the petition against ACTA, was predicted by anger and contempt toward the government, while the only predictor of non-normative collective action, such us hacking governmental websites, was contempt. Previous participation in street protests predicted positively wide range of variables: identification with demonstrators, perceived efficacy of demonstrators, anger and contempt toward the government, attitude toward collective action and intention to engage in normative and non-normative collective action.

How Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation affect Inference of Competence and Communion Traits? The Role of Intergroup Context

Duckitt's two-process theory (Duckitt, 2001) posits that Right–Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) develops in response to threat created by unpredictable and therefore unsafe social world, whereas Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) develops in response to threat to ingroup position (caused by challenging outgroup competitors). Supportive to Duckitt's conceptualization, in an earlier study (Błażewicz & Kofta, 2011) we found that RWA promoted inference of communion traits (likely to buffer threat produced by social world' unpredictability), whereas SDO promoted inference of competence traits (helping to detect and counteract competitors). The present study examined how the discussed pattern is modified by an intergroup context. We expected that RWA (as an ingroup-oriented ideology) should help to infer communion traits mostly in the case of ingroup members, whereas SDO (as an outgroup-oriented ideology), should help to infer competence traits mostly in the case of outgroup members. Results of the on-line study, with 252 participants of both sexes, partly supported our expectations.

"Not so great?!?" Intergroup comparisons, social identity thereat and ascription of competence and communion traits to ingroup and outgroup members.

Fundamental changes of the last two decades, accompanying political (access to EU) and economic (switch to free-market economy) transition, brought about new hopes to Poles but could also be a source of identity threat because they enforce frequent comparisons with highly developed countries of Western Europe. Two experimental online studies with young Polish participants examined how social identity threat, caused by comparisons with a high status group (Poles compared with Germans on a group competence dimension) modifies an ascription of competence, moral and warm-related traits to ingroup and outgroup members. We asked whether a threatening social comparison induces group-defensive strategies and what is their nature. We found that (a) Poles were seen to be less competent and less moral than Germans but showing more interpersonal warmth, and (b) exposure to a comparison threat made participants to deny one's own group inferiority on competence and morality dimensions. Thus, the coping strategy applied by our participants might best be described as a generalized denial of own group' inferiority (it is generalized, because perception of outgroup as much higher on group competence traits made participants not only to deny ingroup inferiority on competence but also on morality dimension).

The Emergence of Antisemitism in Times of Rapid Social Change: Survey results from Poland

That rapid social change often leads to pathologies and societal problems is common knowledge, both in sociology and psychology. (Durkheim, 1938) Economic crises, systemic transitions, and industrial and political revolutions change the lives of individuals and threaten existing social norms. Difficult life conditions lead to feelings of relative deprivation among individuals and groups, and real and imagined deficits and deprivation are also known to increase competitive and prejudiced reactions between ethnic groups (Pettigrew et. al., 2008). In order to discuss the impact of systemic transition and post-transition phenomena on antisemitism in Poland, we decided to summarize most of existing quantitative data gathered in the years preceding the systemic transformation in Poland, and in the twenty years that followed. This allows us to identify trends in the main dimensions of antisemitism: its politicized forms, its historical forms, as well as the 'new antisemitism'. Finally, we also discuss some normative issues, and ask whether the expression of antisemitism in Poland is subject to desirability norms and political correctness.

Jarosław Ziółkowski, Mirosław Kofta, Michał Bilewicz.

Group identification and decision making in morally dilemmatic situations.

Two original studies tested the hypothesis that the way people make decisions in moral dilemmas depends on group identity of those involved in them. It was predicted that participants would be more willing to sacrifice out-group members as compared to ingroup members. However, the results suggest that this effect is mediated by group identification of participants. High-identifiers tend to sacrifice out-group members and protect their in-group. On the other hand, low-identifiers sacrifice much more in-group members, at the same time protecting out-group. Those results correspond to studies by Doosje, Spears, Ellemers et al. on peripheral group membership.

Effects of partner's group membership on the dynamics of trust in a trust game

The emergence of new forms of social and economic relationships, made possible through the development of information and communication technologies, attracts increasing attention to the concept of trust in strangers (e.g, Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009; Hardin, 2001; Kramer, 1999; McKenna & Bargh, 2000). When deciding whether to trust a stranger or not, people often use cues for trustworthiness associated with the stranger, such as their group membership. Despite a vast amount of attention that group identity effects have received in the field of experimental economics in the last decade, the results have so far been neither consistent nor conclusive. Some studies confirm the hypothesis of greater trust for the in-group than for the out-group (e.g. Foddy, Platow & Yamagishi, 2009; Tanis & Postmes, 2005), while others reject it (e.g. Smith, 2011; Trifiletti & Capozza, 2011). In the current study we look at the effects of partner's group membership on the dynamics of trust using an iterated trust game (Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995).

Agent based multilevel modeling of energy policy - Kosice use case"

The energy sector is one of the key areas of the modern states and their economics, having direct impact on the prosperity and wellbeing of societies. It is well known that in the future (in some countries already) ensuring sufficient amounts of energy will be (is) a significant challenge. Trying to cope with this problem policy makers in this field are looking for new solutions. However, most of them are focused on regulatory mechanisms implemented top-down not paying enough attention to the processes occurring spontaneously at the lower levels of the system (meso and micro) which may strongly diminish positive effects of introduced regulations.

Our model aims to show how the phenomena from different levels of the system (macro, meso and micro) affect each other. For this purpose, we decided to integrate in our model dispersed knowledge existing in multiple levels of the system. Information was obtained from stakeholders and supplemented by a general knowledge concerning the social and economic mechanisms."

Wojciech Borkowski, Magda Jagielska, Marta Kacprzyk, Krzysztof Lipiec, Klara Łucznik, Magda Roszczyńska-Kurasińska, Agnieszka Rychwalska, Andrzej Nowak

The role of embeddedness – modeling social factors influencing technology transfer

While it is widely accepted that innovation is one of the crucial factors in the growth and performance of economies, the process of transferring innovative ideas from academia to industry is intricate and difficult to model and predict. Technology transfer (TT) is a complex phenomenon influenced by a number of factors. As Allen (1971) stresses, the informal relations between researchers and their physical location play an important role in the flow of information and their cooperation. On the other hand, recent research suggests that simply creating cooperative links between university and industry is not enough to warrant effective technology transfer (Dosi, Llerena, Labini, 2008). The way these connections are used is crucial for the process. We hypothesized that the degree of embeddedness of social networks (as defined by Granovetter, 1985) largely influences the process of TT – with highly embedded networks resulting in more occurrences of successful TT. To test this hypothesis we constructed a multi agent / network model of the TT process. We adopted an innovative methodology wherein we based the structure of the network and properties of the agents on real life, stylized data gathered through interviews with stakeholders, scenario generation and model consultation with key actors of the TT. We chose the case of Poland as the basis of our model as it provides an excellent example of a TT system where a large potential awaits effective solutions. Results of the simulation model backed up the hypothesis of the crucial role of social embededdness as an important factor influencing the possibility of successful technology transfer.

Kamil Rakocy

Can Google predict election results?

Background: Internet is a huge bank of information which may be treated as some kind of a reflection of real world. The number of information accumulated on the Internet network about a certain object is highly correlated with the number of information about that object in the real world. It is possible to learn a lot about the popularity of a certain person/politician by analysing the number of information about him or her available on the Internet.

Aim: The aim of the project was to determine whether it is possible to use information found on the internet for predicting election results.

Method: There were two independent sources of information in the research: official data set received from Government Election Committee (2007) and data collected with usage of internet search engines. The specialised software put the names of politicians into the search engine and entered the number of found pages into the data base. Results: Linear regression model for the number of votes obtained by each candidate in parliamentary elections (to the Sejm) in 2007, explained nearly 43% of the variance. The variable with most predictive load was popularity of the candidate measured by using the Google search engine. Logistic regression model, indicating the likelihood of a mandate, explained over 71% of the variability (Nagelkerke R²). The presented model correctly classified 96.1%, among the candidates of the most popular electoral committees (5943 candidates out of 6187 were classified correctly). Conclusion: The results showed a clear relationship between the number of information on the internet and the popularity measured by voting results. There is a possibility to join traditional methods of popularity research with the new approach using the

internet as a source of information.